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Abstract
Filtering denotes any method whereby an agent up-
dates its belief state—its knowledge of the state of
the world—from a sequence of actions and obser-
vations. In logical filtering, the belief state is a log-
ical formula describing possible world states and
the agent has a (possibly nondeterministic) logi-
cal model of its environment and sensors. This
paper presents efficient logical filtering algorithms
that maintain a compact belief state representa-
tion indefinitely, for a broad range of environment
classes including nondeterministic, partially ob-
servable STRIPS environments and environments
in which actions permute the state space. Efficient
filtering is also possible when the belief state is rep-
resented using prime implicates, or when it is ap-
proximated by a logically weaker formula.
1 Introduction
Any agent operating in a partially observable environment
must perform computations that distinguish among the a pri-
ori possible current states of the world on the basis of past ob-
servations and actions. These computations may operate di-
rectly on a representation of the action–observation sequence
(e.g., [Winslett, 1990; Kautz et al., 1996]); they may reduce
queries about the current state to queries about the initial state
(e.g., [Reiter, 2001]); or, they may update the belief state (the
agent’s knowledge about the state of the world) after each ac-
tion and observation. This latter approach, called filtering or
recursive state estimation in the control theory literature, is
particularly useful with unbounded sequences of actions and
observations.
The main computational difficulties are 1) the time needed
to update the belief state, and 2) the space required to repre-
sent it. These depend on the nature of the transition model,
which describes how the environment evolves over time, the
observation model, which describes the way in which the en-
vironment generates observations, and the family of repre-
sentations used to denote belief states. Early work, begin-
ning with Gauss, assumed stochastic models. For example,
the Kalman filter [Kalman, 1960] is a ubiquitous device that
maintains a multivariate Gaussian belief state over n vari-
ables, assuming linear–Gaussian transition and observation
model. Crucially, the O(n3) update cost and the O(n2) space
requirement do not depend on the length of the observation
sequence; hence, a Kalman filter can run indefinitely. In this
paper, we are interested in developing analogous results in the
context of logical representations.
We adopt a simple logical language (Section 2) for describ-
ing the transition and observation models; the observations
and the belief state itself are also logical formulae. The ini-
tial state may be only partially known; the transition model,
which allows for actions by the agent itself, may be nondeter-
ministic; and the observation model may be nondeterministic
and partial, in the sense that the agent may not be able to
observe the actual state.
Even when we restrict ourselves to propositional logic, it
is clear that the general filtering problem is nontrivial (we
prove it is computationally hard), because there are exponen-
tially many possible states. We identify several classes of
models that allow efficient filtering with respect to the belief-
state representation size. Our primary method is based on
decomposition theorems showing that 1) filtering distributes
over disjunction in the belief state formula, and 2) filtering
distributes over conjunction and negation if the actions are
permutations of the state space. Such actions serve as one-to-
one mappings between states, for those states in which they
can be applied. We obtain efficient, exact algorithms for DNF
belief states and for NNF (Negation Normal Form - all nega-
tions are in front of atoms) and CNF belief states with per-
muting actions. In other cases, we obtain efficient algorithms
for approximate filtering.
In another class of dynamic systems, we can filter effi-
ciently if the belief state is represented in CNF that includes
all its prime implicates. Finally, we show that STRIPS mod-
els (possibly with nondeterministic effects of actions) also ad-
mit efficient filtering. The STRIPS assumption, that every
action has no conditional effects and that an effect’s precon-
ditions are the preconditions for the action’s execution, is key
to this efficiency.
With respect to maintaining a compact representation, we
show that properties similar to those mentioned above allow
us to filter k-CNF formulae (CNF with clauses of at most k
literals, when k is fixed) such that the result is represented in
k-CNF (for the same fixed k). Thus, the belief state is main-
tained in O(nk) space indefinitely. In particular, we show
mild conditions under which a compact belief state can be
maintained in nondeterministic STRIPS domains and in per-
mutation domains. Finally, we show that DNF belief states
remain compact if the effects of actions are deterministic and
guaranteed to hold. These results are the first analogues, in
the logical arena, of the desirable properties possessed by
Kalman filters for continuous variables.
Ours is by no means the first work on filtering in a logical
context. Early on, it was pointed out that filtering is easy
for deterministic systems with a known initial state [Fikes et
al., 1972; Lin and Reiter, 1997]. Filtering in nondeterministic
domains is more difficult. In particular, the related problem of
temporal projection is coNP-hard when the initial state is not
fully known, or when actions have nondeterministic effects
[Liberatore, 1997] (see also Section 3.3).
Traditionally, computational approaches for filtering take
one of three approaches: 1) enumerate the world states possi-
ble in every belief state and update each of those states sep-
arately, together generating the updated belief state [Ferraris
and Giunchiglia, 2000; Cimatti and Roveri, 2000], 2) list the
sequence of actions and observations and prove queries on
the updated belief state [Reiter, 2001; Sandewall, 1994], or
3) approximate the belief state representation [Son and Baral,
2001; Williams and Nayak, 1996].
The first two approaches cannot be used when there are too
many possible worlds (e.g., when the domain includes more
than a few dozens of fluents and there are more than 240 pos-
sible states) or when the sequence of actions is long (e.g.,
more than 100 actions). Examples include robot localization,
tracking of objects and their relationships, and data mining.
The third approach gives rise to many mistakes that are some-
times dangerous, and requires an approximation that fits the
given problem (if one exists). Many domains of 100 fluents
or less are still computationally infeasible for it.
2 Logical Filtering
In this section we define logical filtering using a transition
model and action semantics that are compatible with the stan-
dard semantics belief update operator of [Winslett, 1990].
(To avoid confusion, this is different from another operator
presented in the same publication, PMA, that applies a non-
monotonic approach to formalize minimal change.) This op-
erator is simple and allows us to examine computational prop-
erties easily. It can represent any logical transition system,
and specifications in other action languages can be compiled
into it [Winslett, 1990; Doherty et al., 1998].
In what follows, for a set of propositional formulae, Ψ,
L(Ψ) is the signature of Ψ, i.e., the set of propositional sym-
bols that appear in Ψ. L(Ψ) is the language of Ψ, i.e., the set
of formulae built with L(Ψ). Similarly, L(L) is the language
of L, for a set of symbols L.
A transition system is a tuple 〈P,S,A,R〉, where
• P is a finite set of propositional fluents;
• S ⊆ Pow(P) is the set of world states;
• A is a finite set of actions;
• R ⊆ S ×A× S is the transition relation.
The intuition for this transition system description is that P is
the set of features that are available for us in the world, every
element in S is a world state (i.e., a subset of P , containing
propositions that are true in this world state), A is the set of
actions in the system and R(s, a, s′) means that state s′ is a
possible result of action a in state s.
A belief state is a set of world states σ ⊆ S. Performing an
action a in a belief state σ results in a belief state that includes
all the world states that may result from a in a world state in
σ. We do not introduce observations in this transition model.
Instead, we assume that observations are given to us (if at all)
as logical sentences after performing an action.
A logical nondeterministic domain description D is a fi-
nite set of statements of the following kinds: value proposi-
tions of the form “initially F ” describe the initial state and
effect rules of the form “a causes F if G” describe the effects
of actions, for F and G being state formulae (propositional
combinations of fluent names). We say that F is the head and
G is the tail of those rules.
For a domain descriptionD we definePD,AD to be the set
of propositional fluents and actions mentioned in D, respec-
tively. For a domain description D we define a transition
relation RD(s, a, s′) as follows.
• A fluent f ∈ PD is possibly affected by action a in state
s, if there is a rule “a causes F if G” in D such that G
is true in s and f ∈ L(F ).
• Let I(a, s) denote the set of fluents in PD that are not
possibly affected by action a in state s.
• Let F (a, s) be a set of all the heads of activated effect
rules in s (i.e., if “a causes F if G” is activated in s,
then F ∈ F (a, s)). We consider the case of F (a, s) = ∅
(no activated effect rules) as F (a, s) ≡ TRUE.
• Define (recalling that world states are sets of fluents)
RD =
{
〈s, a, s′〉
∣∣∣∣ (s′ ∩ I(a, s)) = (s ∩ I(a, s))and F (a, s) is true in s′
}
(1)
When there is no confusion, we write R for RD.
If action a has an effect of FALSE in s, then it cannot execute.
In partially observable domains, we update our knowledge
as a result of executing an action and collecting observations
in the resulting state. The following definition of filtering as-
sumes that σ is a set of world states. We use our transition
operator R to define the resulting belief state from each ac-
tion. An observation o is a formula in our language.
Definition 2.1 (Logical Filtering Semantics). Let σ ⊆ S
be a belief state. The filtering of a sequence of actions and
observations 〈a1, o1, . . . , at, ot〉 is defined as follows:
1. Filter[ǫ](σ) = σ;
2. Filter[a](σ) = {s′ | 〈s, a, s′〉 ∈ R, s ∈ σ};
3. Filter[o](σ) = {s ∈ σ | o is true in s};
4. Filter[〈ai, oi, . . . , at, ot〉](σ) =
Filter[〈ai+1, oi+1, . . . , at, ot〉]
(Filter[oi](Filter[ai](σ))).
We call Step 2 progression with a and Step 3 filtering with o.
For example, consider a robot that is in charge of cleaning
a room. It can execute an action a = fetch(broom, closet)
which has the single effect rule “a causes has(broom) ∧
¬in(broom, closet) if in(broom, closet)”. Assume that the
robot’s belief state is σ = Pow(P) (i.e., it consid-
ers all states possible). Then, Filter[a](σ) = {s ∈
Pow(P) | ¬in(broom, closet) is true in s}, i.e., after per-
forming the action a we consider all worlds that satisfy
¬in(broom, closet) possible. This is because if we are ini-
tially in a state in which in(broom, closet), then the resulting
state is one in which ¬in(broom, closet), and if we are ini-
tially in a state in which ¬in(broom, closet), then we stay
in the same state (thus, still satisfying ¬in(broom, closet)).
Call this resulting belief state σ′. Now, if an observation
o = has(broom) is received, then Filter[o](σ′) is exactly the
set of worlds that satisfy ¬in(broom, closet) and has(broom).
3 Filtering Logical Formulae
Approaches to filtering actions and observations that at any
stage enumerate the states in a belief state do not scale to
large domains. An alternative approach is to perform logical
progression in a form similar to the one described by [Lin and
Reiter, 1997; McIlraith, 1998]. The difference is that now we
wish to do so (efficiently) in the context of nondeterministic
actions and observations.
In this section we present a straightforward algorithm that
filters belief state formulae directly, but does so in worst-case
exponential time. This algorithm serves as a starting point
for Section 4, where we propose efficient algorithms. We
also present distribution properties of filtering over the log-
ical connectives ∧,∨,¬, and examine the theoretical limita-
tions of formula filtering. These will guide us in Section 4,
and allow us to present classes of systems that are not subject
to those limitations and can be tracked in polynomial time
and a compact fashion indefinitely.
3.1 Zeroth-Order Filtering Algorithm
In the rest of the paper we assume that a fixed set of flu-
ents persists for action a in all states in which it has an
effect. Eff(a) is the set of fluents possibly affected by a, and
Eff(a) is P \ Eff(a). Some of the following notation assumes
an implicit action, when this causes no confusion.
We represent a belief state σ as a logical formula ϕ such
that a state is in σ iff it satisfies ϕ. The filtering of a belief
state formula with an action and an observation is a formula
representing the consequences of our effect rules and obser-
vation on states that satisfy our initial formula. We specify
this filtering process formally using the following notation.
For a set of effect rules r1, . . . , rl for action a, each of
the form “a causes Fi if Gi”, write F ′i = Fi[P/P′], for
P ′ = {f ′1, . . . , f
′
n} a set of new symbols for fluents, [P/P ′]
a shorthand for [f1/f ′1, ..., fn/f ′n], and [f/f ′] means that we
replace all instances of symbol f in the formula by instances
of symbol f ′. Here, we view P as the set of fluents in some
time t, and P ′ as the same fluents in time t + 1. We add the
following set of rules for action a:
C = {“a causes p if p”, “a causes ¬p if ¬p” | p /∈ Eff(a)}
∪{“a causes p if p ∧ G¯” | p ∈ Eff(a)}
∪{“a causes ¬p if ¬p ∧ G¯” | p ∈ Eff(a)}
where
G¯ = ¬G1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬Gl, (2)
the assertion that no precondition of a holds. This has a sim-
ilar effect to adding frame axioms to a set of effect axioms in
an action language. We let r1, ..., rm be the complete set of
rules for a and call the new rules, C = {rl+1, ..., rm}, com-
pletion rules for a.
We filter a belief-state formula as follows. (We reuse
Filter[·](·) for filtering a belief-state formula.) Let Cn(Ψ)
be the set of logical consequences of Ψ (i.e., formulae ψ such
that Ψ |= ψ), and CnL(Ψ) be Cn(Ψ) ∩ L, the set of logical
consequences of Ψ in the language L. We write CnL(Ψ),
when L is a set of symbols, to mean CnL(L)(Ψ).
1. Filter[a](ϕ) =
(CnP
′
(ϕ ∧
∧
i≤m((ϕ⇒ Gi)⇒ F
′
i )))[P′/P];
2. Filter[o](ϕ) = ϕ ∧ o.
For example, consider action a = fetch(broom, closet)
which has the single effect rule “a causes has(broom) ∧
¬in(broom, closet) if in(broom, closet)”, and consider a be-
lief state formula ϕ = TRUE (i.e., we consider all states
possible). Then, Filter[a](ϕ) ≡ ¬in(broom, closet), i.e.,
after performing the action a we consider all worlds that
satisfy ¬in(broom, closet) possible (similar to our example
in Section 2). Call this resulting belief state formula ϕ′.
Now, if an observation o = has(broom) is received, then
Filter[o](ϕ′) ≡ ¬in(broom, closet) ∧ has(broom).
The following generalizes a theorem presented in [Doherty
et al., 1998] by allowing conditional and inconsistent effects.
Theorem 3.1. If ϕ is a belief state formula, and a an action,
then
Filter[a]({s ∈ S | s satisfies ϕ}) =
{s ∈ S | s satisfies Filter[a](ϕ)}
Proof. See Section A.1
Our zeroth-order algorithm computes
Filter[〈a1, o1, ..., at, ot〉](ϕ) by iterating the appli-
cation of filtering of a belief-state formula with an
action and an observation. It sets ϕ0 = ϕ and
ϕi = Filter[oi](Filter[ai](ϕi−1)) recursively for i > 0
using the two equalities defined above. This algorithm is
correct, as shown by Theorem 3.1. It can be implemented
using a consequence finder in a restricted language (e.g.,
[Simon and del Val, 2001]).
From here on, when we say filtering we refer to filtering of
a belief-state formula, unless otherwise mentioned.
3.2 Distribution Properties and Permutation
We can decompose the filtering of a formula ϕ along logical
connectives once we establish several distribution properties.
Theorem 3.2 (Distribution over Connectives). Let a be an
action, and let ϕ,ψ be formulae. Then,
1. Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ) ∨ Filter[a](ψ)
2. |= Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ)
3. |= Filter[a](¬ϕ)⇐ ¬Filter[a](ϕ)∧Filter[a](TRUE)
Proof. See Section A.2
We can say something stronger for actions that act as per-
mutations on the states in S in which they can be executed.
Definition 3.3 (Permuting Actions). Action a is permuting,
if for every state s′ there is at most one s such thatR(s, a, s′).
Domains that include only permuting actions are called
permutation domain.
For example, consider a = fetch(broom, closet) from
above, and assume that we add a second effect rule “a
causes FALSE if ¬in(broom, closet)”. Thus, a is not exe-
cutable unless its first rule’s precondition holds. Then, the ac-
tion is a one-to-one mapping between states, when this map-
ping is defined (it is not defined when a state maps to no re-
sulting state). If this second rule is not added, then the action
is not one-to-one because it maps two different states (in the
first we already have the broom and in the second the broom
is in the closet) to the same state.
In the same spirit, an action pickUp(A,B) that picks up
block A from the top of block B is one-to-one when it is pos-
sible because we can find a single previous state for every
resulting state. The same holds for putDown(A,C). Other
natural examples include turning a row in a Rubik’s cube,
flipping a light switch, and buying a gallon of gas. In con-
trast, turning on the light, setting a Rubik’s cube to a partic-
ular configuration, and filling up the gas tank are not permu-
tation actions. Notice that we allow different actions to map
different states to the same state (e.g., accelerating by 5MPH
when driving 40MPH results in the same state as when decel-
erating by 5MPH when driving 50MPH).
Theorem 3.4 (Distribution for Permutation Domains). Let
a be a permuting action, and let ϕ,ψ be formulae. Then,
1. Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ) ∨ Filter[a](ψ)
2. Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ)
3. Filter[a](¬ϕ) ≡ ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](TRUE)
Proof Sketch. See Section A.3.
3.3 Limitations for Compact Representation
It may be argued that filtering may require only polynomial
space, if we limit ourselves to initial belief states that are rep-
resented compactly and to actions whose effects and precon-
ditions are represented compactly. In Theorem 3.8 we show
the contrary. That is, for every general-purpose representa-
tion of belief states there is a dynamic system, an initial be-
lief state, and a sequence of actions after which our belief
state representation is exponential in the representation of the
initial belief state.
P/poly is a nonstandard computational complexity class
that includes problems that can be answered in polynomial
time, if we are given a polynomial-length hint that depends
only on the length of the input problem. It is considered
likely that NP ∩ co-NP 6⊆ P/poly. Assume so, and let f(σ)
(σ ⊆ 2S ) encode belief states using n propositional symbols.
Theorem 3.5 (Craig’s Interpolation Theorem [Craig,
1957]). If α ⊢ β, then there is a formula γ involving only
symbols common to both α and β, such that α ⊢ γ and γ ⊢ β.
Theorem 3.6 ([Boppana and Sipser, 1990]). Assume that
for every propositional implication A |= B there is a Craig
interpolant C such that A |= C and C |= B and |C| ≤
poly(|A|+ |B|). Then NP ∩ co-NP ⊆ P/poly.
Consequently, if NP ∩ co-NP 6⊆ P/poly, then there is a dy-
namic system, a belief state σ that can be represented com-
pactly, and a short sequence of actions (without observations)
such that the result of filtering σ with that sequence has no
compact representation. This is stated precisely in the fol-
lowing theorem. In the following we denote the length (in
symbol instances) of formula ϕ by |ϕ|, and similarly for a
domain description D.
Theorem 3.7. Let poly(n) be a polynomial function of n.
Assume that for every dynamic system D, belief state repre-
sentation ϕ0, and sequence of actions a1, ..., am in D there is
a belief state representation ϕi of the belief state after action
ai such that |ϕi| ≤ poly(|ϕ0| · |D| · i). Then, NP ∩ co-
NP ⊆ P/poly.
Proof. See appendix A.13.
This theorem guarantees the existence of at least one sys-
tem whose belief state representation grows rapidly. How
simple can this system be and still hold this bad property?
It turns out that there is such a system (in fact, many systems)
that is deterministic, and with actions whose effects and pre-
conditions are limited to a few fluents.
Theorem 3.8. There is dynamic system D with n fluents, be-
lief state σ0, and action sequence a1, ..., an such that, for all
i ≤ n, σi = Filter[ai](σi−1), and |f(σn)| > poly(|f(σ0)| ·
|D| · n). (|D| is the representation size of D.)
Proof. See appendix A.14.
The proof of this theorem reduces the problem of repre-
senting the belief state after performing an action to that of
representing a Craig Interpolant.
4 Efficient and Indefinitely Compact Filtering
In this section we present the main contribution of this paper,
namely, a polynomial-time algorithm that computes logical
filtering exactly for a significant class of transition systems.
For some special cases we present simpler algorithms that
are even more efficient. For systems that do not fall within
this class our algorithm gives an approximation to the filter-
ing. Also, we show that we can keep the representation of
the filtered belief state compact indefinitely for a class of dy-
namic systems. This class includes nondeterministic STRIPS
systems and some systems whose actions are permuting.
The theorems that we consider most important are the fol-
lowing three. Let |ϕ| be the number of literals inϕ’s represen-
tation, let #rules(a) be the number of effect rules defining
a, and let G¯a = G¯ be the precondition of a as defined in
(2). Assume that the effect rules that define a given action
have identical sets of affected propositional symbols (how-
ever, different actions may have different such sets).
Theorem 4.1 (Efficiency). Given NNF formula ϕ, action
a, and observation o, the filtering algorithm in Figure 1
returns the filtering of ϕ with a and o, if a is permuting.
If a is not permuting, then the algorithm returns an logi-
cally weaker formula than the filtering. It does so in time
O(|ϕ| · 2#rules(a)+|L(G¯a)|).
Theorem 4.2 (Compact Filtering). Given k-CNF formula ϕ
(fixed k), deterministic action a, and observation o in k-CNF,
the filtering of ϕ with a and o is in k-CNF, if a is permut-
ing, Filter[a](TRUE) is in k-CNF, and for every literal ℓ
in ϕ, Filter[a](ℓ) ≡ Filter[a](TRUE) ∧ T , where T is a
conjunction of literals.
If a is not permuting, then the algorithm in Figure 1 still
returns a formula in k-CNF.
The conditions on action a in the last theorem hold, e.g., for
actions whose every defining rule has a precondition that is a
single clause (e.g., a literal). It also holds for actions which
are defined by at most two rules, and actions that affect all the
literals that appear in their preconditions.
Finally, for nondeterministic STRIPS actions (actions that
have no conditional effects) we get efficiency and compact
representation. Let k-PI-CNF denote the class of k-CNF for-
mulae that include all their prime implicates (i.e., ϕ in k-PI-
CNF iff ϕ in k-CNF and for every clause C, if ϕ |= C, then
there is a clause C ′ in ϕ such that C ′ subsumes C). Every
formula can be represented in k-PI-CNF for some k.
Theorem 4.3 (STRIPS Actions). Given k-PI-CNF formula
ϕ (fixed k), STRIPS action a with effect in k-PI-CNF, and
observation o in 2-CNF, the filtering of ϕ with a and o is
computed in time O(|ϕ| · k+2|L(G¯a)|). The result is in k-PI-
CNF, if after observing o we know if a succeeded or failed.
4.1 Closed-Form Solution and Factored Filtering
Our zeroth-order filtering algorithm uses consequence finding
tools which do not scale to large domains. The following
always holds and suggests a different reasoning procedure.
Filter[a](ϕ) ≡
∧
i1,...,iu≤m, ϕ|=Gi1∨...∨Giu
(Fi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fiu). (3)
We can compute Filter[a](ϕ) by testing queries of the
form ϕ |= Gi1 ∨ . . . ∨Giu (instead of applying consequence
finding). On the other hand, it requires an exponential num-
ber in m of such tests (recall, m is the number of rules, in-
cluding the completion rules). Since m > 2n (there are two
completion rules for each of the n domain features), this is
worse computationally than the method of enumerating all
the states.
In what follows we use the intuition that we need only few
rules if ϕ includes only a small subset of P , the fluent sym-
bols of our domain. In general, ϕ may include many fluent
symbols because we may know many things about many dif-
ferent parts of our domain. Nevertheless, if we can decom-
pose ϕ into small parts that can be filtered separately, then
each of the parts includes only a small subset of P , and filter-
ing each of the parts separately becomes easy.
Assume that we order the rules of a such that r1, ..., rt (t ≤
l) satisfy L(Fi) ∩ L(Gi) = ∅ (ri = “a causes Fi if Gi”, i ≤
t), and rt+1, ..., rl satisfy L(Fi) ∩ L(Gi) 6= ∅. Furthermore,
let rm+1 be the additional rule “a causes G¯ if G¯” (recall, m
is the number of rules of a, including completion rules). We
define B to be
B =
∧
i≤t
(¬Gi∨Fi) ∧
∧
i1,...,iu∈{t+1,...,l,m+1}
(G˜i1,...,iu ∨
∨
f≤u
Fif ) (4)
where G˜i1,...,iu ≡ CnEff(a)(
∧
f≤u ¬Gif ).
B is a term that is always implied by Filter[a](TRUE),
i.e., the progression of zero knowledge with the action a. The
first set of conjuncts of B is the result of applying a rule “a
causes Fi if Gi” whose preconditions are not affected by ex-
ecuting a. Even when we know nothing before performing
a, we will know that either the effect occurred or the precon-
dition did not hold and still does not hold. The second set of
conjuncts applies a similar intuition for the case of effect rules
that may affect the truth value of their original preconditions.
Define C(L) to be the set of completion rules of a for flu-
ents in L, i.e., C(L) = {i > l | the effect of ri ∈ C is in L}.
We can now state the fundamental theorem of this Section.
It holds for all domains expressed using our action language.
Theorem 4.4 (Closed-Form Representation). If ϕ is a be-
lief state formula and {r1, . . . , rl} is the set of effect rules for
action a, each of the form “a causes Fi if Gi”, then
Filter[a](ϕ) ≡
∧
i1, ..., iu ∈ {1, ...l, m + 1} ∪ C(L(ϕ)),
ϕ |= Gi1 ∨ ... ∨ Giu
(Fi1 ∨ ... ∨ Fiu)
∧
B (5)
Proof. See Section A.4.
The intuition for equation (5) is that progressing ϕ with an
action a can be computed by looking at all the possible com-
bination of preconditions of effect rules and completion rules
for L(ϕ). If we can prove that G1 ∨ G2 holds from ϕ, then
we can conclude that F1 ∨F2 holds in the result of executing
a. The conclusions that are not accounted for with this intu-
ition are the effects that we infer from the completion rules in
C(L(G1, ..., Gl)) together with the effect rules for a. Those
conclusions are summarized in B, which is independent of ϕ.
PROCEDURE NNF-Filter(〈ai, oi〉0<i≤t,ϕ)
∀i, ai an action, oi an NNF observation, ϕ a belief-state formula.
1. If t = 0, return ϕ.
2. Set B as in equation (4) for at but in NNF form.
3. Return ot ∧ B∧ NNF-ProgressStep(at,
NNF-Filter(〈ai, oi〉0<i≤(t−1),ϕ)).
PROCEDURE NNF-ProgressStep(a,ϕ)
a an action. ϕ a belief-state formula, r1, ..., rl, rm+1 rules for a.
1. If ϕ is a literal, then return the NNF form of∧
{
∨
i∈I Fi | I ⊆ {1, ..., l, m+1}∪C(L(ϕ)), ϕ |=
∨
i∈I Gi}.
2. If ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, then return
NNF-ProgressStep(a, ϕ1) ∨ NNF-ProgressStep(a, ϕ2).
3. It must be that ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. Return
NNF-ProgressStep(a, ϕ1) ∧ NNF-ProgressStep(a, ϕ2).
Figure 1: Filtering an NNF formula.
Our NNF filtering algorithm is presented in Figure 1. It
is much faster than our zeroth-order algorithm, and it relies
on Theorems 4.4, 3.2, and 3.4. In the following, if ψ is a
logically weaker formula than our filtering, we say that it is a
safe approximation for filtering. We denote effects by Fi and
preconditions by Gi. For an action a, set t = |
⋃
i≤l L(Gi)|.
Corollary 4.5 (NNF Filtering). Let ϕ be a formula in NNF
with h literals, and let a be an action with l effect rules. Then,
NNF-Filter safely approximates Filter[a](ϕ) in time O(h ·
2l+t). If a is permuting, then this computation is exact.
Proof. See Section A.5
Extended Example
As an example, consider our room-cleaning robot from
above, and the action a = fetch(broom, closet), with the
slightly more elaborate effect rule “a causes has(broom) ∧
¬in(broom, closet) if in(broom, closet) ∧ ¬locked(closet)”.
Assume that our robot has its belief state represented by
¬locked(closet) ∧ (in(broom, closet) ∨ in(broom, shed)).
NNF-Filter filters each of the literals separately with a and
combines the results. For a given literal, filtering is mostly
done is step 1 of NNF-ProgressStep. We describe how this is
done for each of the literals in our robot’s belief state.
NNF-ProgressStep(a,¬locked(closet)) tests in step 1 all
possible entailments of the form ¬locked(closet) |=
∨
i∈I Gi,
where I includes elements from the effect rule of a, the
frame rule for G¯ (rule rm+1), and the completion rule for
¬locked(closet). For brevity, denote the effect of a by F1,
and the precondition for that rule by G1. There is only one
effect rule defining a, so in this case G¯ = ¬G1.
In that step, one of our tests finds that
¬locked(closet) |= G1 ∨ G¯
(because G1 ∨ G¯ = G1 ∨ ¬G1 ≡ TRUE). This makes
us include F1 ∨ G¯ in the filtering. In the same step, another
test finds that ¬locked(closet) |= ¬locked(closet) (trivially
true). This makes us include ¬locked(closet) in the filter-
ing. The conjunction of the two is logically equivalent to
¬in(broom, closet) ∧ ¬locked(closet). This is the result of
filtering ¬locked(closet) with a.
Similarly, for in(broom, closet), one of our tests in step 1
of NNF-ProgressStep finds that
in(broom, closet) |= G1 ∨ (G¯ ∧ in(broom, closet))
(because G1 ∨ (G¯ ∧ in(broom, closet)) ≡ G1 ∨
in(broom, closet), and the latter follows trivially from
in(broom, closet)). As before, we also find that
in(broom, closet) |= G1 ∨ G¯. We find that the filter-
ing of in(broom, closet) with a is (in(broom, closet) ∨
has(broom))∧ (¬in(broom, closet)∨ locked(closet)). Notice
that this belief state implies has(broom) ∨ locked(closet).
For the filtering of the last literal, in(broom, shed), we
find its filtering to be equivalent to in(broom, shed) ∧
(¬in(broom, closet) ∨ locked(closet)). (Notice, that we do
not know that the broom is not in the closet because initially
we did not know that the broom cannot be in more than one
place; we made this choice to simplify this example.)
Now, we recurse back in the algorithm and com-
bine the filtered formulae. We find that the filter-
ing of in(broom, closet) ∨ in(broom, shed) is equivalent
to (in(broom, shed) ∨ in(broom, closet) ∨ has(broom)) ∧
(¬in(broom, closet)∨ locked(closet)). Notice that this belief
state implies in(broom, shed)∨has(broom)∨ locked(closet).
Finally, for the original belief state, ¬locked(closet) ∧
(in(broom, closet) ∨ in(broom, shed)), we conjoin the last
result with the filtering of ¬locked(closet) and get
(in(broom, shed) ∨ has(broom))∧
¬in(broom, closet) ∧ ¬locked(closet)
4.2 DNF and CNF Belief States
If ϕ is in DNF (a disjunction of conjunctions), then we can
limit the size of the resulting formula. We writeD∧a |= ψ to
say that action a has effect rules inD that logically imply ψ in
a state in which a is executed (e.g., ¬G¯ may be a tautology).
Corollary 4.6 (Iterating DNF Filtering). Let ϕ be in DNF
with h literals and s disjuncts, and a an action with l effect
rules with {Fi}i≤l in DNF with d disjuncts total, and {Gi}i≤l
in CNF, each with c conjuncts. Then, Filter[a](ϕ) in DNF is
computed exactly in time O(h·2l+t) with at most max(2s, 1)·(
d
d/2
)
· cl disjuncts. If D ∧ a |= ¬G¯, then it has at most
max(s, 1) ·
(
d
d/2
)
· cl disjuncts.
Proof. See Section A.6.
Thus, when a is a deterministic action (every rule’s effect
is a conjunction of literals) with a single effect rule that is
always guaranteed to succeed, then the number of disjuncts
in the formula does not grow as the filtering progresses.
For CNF formulae we can find a more significant class of
actions that allow us to maintain compact representation. We
show that under some conditions every k-CNF formula is fil-
tered into a k-CNF formula (fixed k). This implies that the
belief state representation is no larger than (2n)k, which is
manageable for small fixed k’s.
The main observation that we use is that a clause of k liter-
als may give rise to a larger clause after filtering, only if one
of the following holds: (a) the filtering of TRUE includes a
clause of more than k literals; or (b) the filtering of a literal
includes a clause of 2 or more literals that is not subsumed by
Filter[a](TRUE). The first case can occur when we do not
know whether the action succeeded or not, and which rules
applied if it did. In that case, we know that after the action
one of the effects holds or no precondition holds (this yields a
formula which may include many disjunctions). The second
case can occur when the precondition of a rule includes a con-
junction of literals. When we filter a single literal we may get
a disjunction in the result (of the form the effect holds, or the
rest of the precondition does not). When we filter a clause,
this may cause the filtering to include a larger clause.
The following theorem describes sufficient conditions for
filtering a k-CNF formula into k-CNF, thus keeping the rep-
resentation compact (k is fixed).
Theorem 4.7 (Filtering a k-CNF Clause). Let C be a k-
CNF clause, and action a have l effect rules, all deterministic.
Assume that B is in k-CNF, and that whenever f |=
∨
i∈I Gi
for literal f and I ⊂ {1, ..., l,m+1}, |I| ≥ 2, then D ∧ a |=∨
i∈I Gi or f |= Gi for some i ∈ I . Then, Filter[a](C) is in
k-CNF and can be computed in time O(2l+t).
Proof. See Section A.7.
Note that B is in k-CNF for an action a when
|
⋃
i≤l L(Gi)∪ Eff(a)| ≤ k or |
⋃
i≤l L(Gi) \ Eff(a)|+ l ≤ k
or l = 1 and |L(G1)| −min(1, |L(F1) \ L(G1)|) ≤ k.
Consequently, filtering with actions that are permuting
maintains a k-CNF if |=
∨
i∈I Gi whenever f |=
∨
i∈I Gi
for some |I| ≥ 2. An example of such an action is flipping a
switch (if the light is on, it will get turned off, and vice versa).
One of the preconditions always holds. Another example is
moving a block (whichever it is) from the top of a stack. For
literal f , if f |= top(A) ∨ top(B), then the disjunction is
implied by D ∧ a or a single precondition follows from f .
Corollary 4.8 (Iterating CNF Filtering). If ϕ is in k-CNF,
then the assumptions of Theorem 4.7 imply that Filter[a](ϕ)
is approximated safely in time O(|ϕ| · 2l+t), with a result in
k-CNF. If a is permuting, then this computation is exact.
4.3 Prime-Implicate Belief States
It turns out that a form of distribution over conjunction holds
for all actions if the belief state is represented as the conjunc-
tion of all of its prime implicates (formulae we call prime im-
plicate belief states (PI-CNF)). In this form we can distribute
the computation to the conjuncts and conjoin the result of fil-
tering small subgroups of them separately. More precisely,
Filter[a](ϕ) ≡
∧
j1,...,jz≤s
Filter[a](
∧
g≤z
Cjg ) (6)
for z a number that depends on the representation of the pre-
conditions of a and on the number of rules defining a.
PROCEDURE PI-Filter(〈ai, oi〉0<i≤t,ϕ)
∀i, ai an action, oi an observation, ϕ a belief-state formula.
1. If t = 0, return ϕ.
2. Return the PI-CNF form of
ot∧ PI-ProgressStep(at, PI-Filter(〈ai, oi〉0<i≤(t−1),ϕ)).
PROCEDURE PI-ProgressStep(a,ϕ)
a an action, ϕ a belief-state formula. r1, ..., rl, rm+1 rules for a.
1. Let res ← TRUE.
2. For every i1, ..., ij ∈ {1, ..., l, m+1}, and f1, ..., fu literals
in Pre(a) \ Eff(a), do
(a) Let∧g≤z Cˆg be the CNF representation of∨h≤j Gih .
(b) For every g ≤ z, nondeterministically choose a clause
Cg in ϕ whose restriction to Pre(a) subsumes Cˆg .
(c) If there is a clause for every g ≤ z, then set res ←
res ∧ F , where F is
∨
h≤j(Fih ∨ (Cih ∩ Eff(a))).
3. Return res.
Figure 2: Filtering a Prime-Implicate CNF formula.
Theorem 4.9 (Filtering Prime Implicates: DNF Precond.).
Let ϕ be in k-PI-CNF. Let action a have l effect rules with
effects in k-CNF and preconditions in t-DNF with at most d
disjuncts. Then, equation (6) holds for z = tl·d ·(l ·d+1), and
PI-Filter (Figure 2) computes Filter[a](ϕ) exactly in time
O(2l·|Pre(a)∪Eff(a)| · (sz + z)). If D∧ a |= ¬G¯, then z = tl·d,
and the computation takes O(2l · (sz + z)) time.
Proof. See Section A.8
Theorem 4.10 (Filtering Prime Implicates). Let ϕ be in k-
PI-CNF (PI-CNF and k-CNF), and let action a have l effect
rules with effects in k-CNF and preconditions in d-CNF, with
eachGi of at most c clauses. Then, equation (6) holds for z =
cl · (dc + 1), and PI-Filter (Figure 2) computes Filter[a](ϕ)
exactly in time O(2l·|Pre(a)∪Eff(a)| ·(sz+z)). If D∧a |= ¬G¯,
then z = cl, with O(2l · (sz + z)) time.
Corollary 4.11 (Maintaining k-PI-CNF). Let ϕ be a k-PI-
CNF formula, and let action a have l effect rules, all deter-
ministic. Assume that Gi is a disjunction of literals, for all
i ≤ l. Also, assume that D∧a |= ¬G¯. Then, Filter[a](ϕ) ≡
PI-ProgressStep(a,ϕ), and the latter is in k-CNF. If k = 2,
then PI-Filter(a,ϕ) is in k-PI-CNF.
Proof. See Section A.9.
The conclusion for k = 2 uses the fact that every prime
implicate of a formula in 2-CNF is a clause with at most two
literals. Simple counter examples (omitted) show that k-PI-
CNF cannot be maintained without these conditions.
4.4 Nondeterministic STRIPS Domains
STRIPS domains present a special case of the results that we
discussed above. In such domains every action has a single
rule (no conditional effects) and actions can be executed only
when their preconditions hold1. Unlike the original STRIPS,
we allow nondeterministic effects, and allow belief states to
be any CNF formulae in the fluents of the domain.
More precisely, every action a has exactly two effect rules,
r1, r2. Their preconditions are such that G1 ≡ ¬G2. Also,
F2 ≡ FALSE. Thus, a can be executed only when G1
holds. Consequently, when we filter with a we assert im-
plicitly that its preconditions held in the last world state.
The assumption that there is only one rule that determines
a’s effects and otherwise the action is not executed has a dra-
matic effect. For l1, ..., lk literals we get that
Filter[a](l1 ∨ ... ∨ lk) ≡{
Ta ∃i ≤ k li ∈ L(Eff(a))
Ta ∧
∨
i≤k li l1, ..., lk /∈ L(Eff(a))
(7)
for Ta = Filter[a](TRUE).
Theorem 4.12 (Iterating STRIPS Filtering: CNF). Let ϕ
be in k-CNF with s clauses and a a STRIPS action. If F1 is
in k-CNF and |L(G1) \ L(F1)| ≤ t, for some t ≤ k, then
Filter[a](ϕ) can be approximated safely in time O(s · k +
2t), yielding a k-CNF formula. If a is permuting, then this
computation is exact.
Proof. See section A.10.
If our representation is PI-CNF, then we get an even
stronger result, leading to the algorithm in Figure 3.
1With the alternate assumption that actions have no effect un-
less their preconditions hold, but observations (or their absence) are
guaranteed to distinguish actions’ success from failure, the same re-
sults hold, except that now the compactness of representation re-
mains only after filtering with observations.
Theorem 4.13 (Factoring STRIPS filtering: PI-CNF). Let∧
i≤s Ci be in PI-CNF, and let a be a STRIPS action. Then,
Filter[a](
∧
i≤s
Ci) ≡
∧
i≤s
Filter[a](Ci).
Proof. See Section A.11.
For example, for a = fetch(broom, closet) that has ef-
fect F1 = has(broom) ∧ ¬in(broom, closet), if we know
(in(broom, closet)∨¬locked(closet))∧(in(broom, shed)∨
locked(closet)) before applying a, then after it we know
F1 ∧ (in(broom, shed) ∨ locked(closet)).
Corollary 4.14 (Iterating STRIPS filtering: k-PI-CNF).
Let ϕ be in k-PI-CNF, and let a be a STRIPS action with
F1 in k-PI-CNF, t = |L(G1) \ L(F1)|, and t ≤ k. Then,
STRIPS-Filter(a,ϕ) computes Filter[a](ϕ) exactly in time
O(|ϕ| · k + 2t), yielding a k-PI-CNF formula.
Proof. See Section A.12.
This means that we can filter in practice any prime im-
plicate belief state in any nondeterministic STRIPS domain.
This filtering stays compact, with the size depending only on
the PI-CNF representation of F1 and the number of proposi-
tional symbols in G1 but not F1.
Finally, every STRIPS action can be filtered efficiently,
even if we drop the assumption that either the action succeeds
or we observe an error. This can be done by assuming that the
action succeeds, finding the filtering of that action, and then
disjoining the result with the initial belief state. Nonetheless,
this scheme may cause representation space explosion as fil-
tering proceeds over multiple steps, unless some care is taken.
PROCEDURE STRIPS-Filter(〈ai, oi〉0<i≤t,ϕ)
∀i, ai an action, oi an observation, ϕ a belief-state formula.
1. For i from 1 to t do,
(a) Set ϕ′ ← ∧C∈ϕ Filter[ai](C), where Filter[ai](C)
is computed using (7), and eliminate subsumed clauses.
(b) Let ϕ be the prime implicates of ϕ′ ∧ oi.
2. Return ϕ.
Figure 3: Filtering a PI-CNF formula with STRIPS actions.
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Figure 4: STRIPS-Filter in the blocks world.
We tested our STRIPS-filter algorithm in partially observ-
able blocks-world domains. The implementation in LISP in-
cludes a random action-sequence and observation-sequence
generator, and both the generator and filtering algorithm re-
ceive a description of the domain, actions and observations
specified in PDDL (a plan-problem specification language).
We ran the algorithm with blocks-world domains of in-
creasing sizes (3 to 20 blocks), yielding domains that range
from tens to over a thousand of propositional features. We
collected the time taken per filtering step for each of the exe-
cutions and the space taken overall at every iteration, starting
with zero knowledge. The results are shown in Figure 4.
4.5 Observation Model
An observation model is a theoryO that includes observation
constraints, axioms that describe the relationship between ob-
served facts and other fluents. We allow O to include any ax-
ioms. Our model assumes that observations o are collected
after an action is executed. o is a sentence made up with flu-
ents, similar to the observation constraints. The conjunction,
O∧o is then used to filter the resulting belief state. Formally,
Filter[o](ϕ) = ϕ ∧ o ∧ O. (8)
This allows all the results that we enumerated above to ap-
ply with this model as well. The following connects the
results of Sections 3,4 to filtering with observations.
Corollary 4.15. If o ∧O is in k-CNF and Filter[a](ϕ) is in
k-CNF, then Filter[a, o](ϕ) is in k-CNF.
In particular, this means that our results for STRIPS do-
mains and for NNF, CNF and DNF formulae still hold here.
Thus, the representation remains compact in the cases that we
indicated already, and computation remains easy in the same
cases as well. Finally, for k-PI-CNF, we get the following.
Corollary 4.16 (Obs. and k-PI-CNF). If o∧O is in 2-CNF,
and ϕ is in k-PI-CNF, then Filter[o](ϕ) is in k-PI-CNF.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we presented the task of logical filtering and
gave it a computational treatment. The results we obtained
here have implications for monitoring and controlling dy-
namic systems. In many cases we present a closed-form com-
putation of the filtering and in others show how to approxi-
mate this computation. In some cases we can guarantee that
the size of the representation of the filtered formula can be
bounded and kept small. In those cases, logical filtering can
be used to control processes that run over very long periods
of time. Examples of such systems are abundant and include
robot motion control, natural language processing, and agents
that explore partially observed worlds.
We made use of several assumptions in this paper in differ-
ent contexts and with different consequences. We presented
permutation domains and the certainty of existence of an ef-
fect (D∧a |= ¬G¯) as characteristics of the domain that make
filtering easier. We showed that the commonly used assump-
tion that every action has a relatively small number of rules
(at most polynomial in n), and that effects, preconditions and
terms in the belief state typically use a small vocabulary, all
have a drastic effect on the computational effort needed for
filtering and on the size of the resulting belief state.
The need to track the state of the world is a basic one, and
many works have appealed to it implicitly in the past. How-
ever, the computational treatment of such tracking has been
avoided so far, partially due to the absence of a developed
theory of nondeterministic domains, and partially due to neg-
ative results about the general cases of this task. Nonethe-
less, this problem and methods for its solution have received
much attention in control theory. The results we obtained here
promise to find their application in this domain and may be
combined with stochastic filtering techniques.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We show that the two sets of world states have the
same elements. We show first that the left-hand side of the
equality is contained in the right-hand side.
Take s′ ∈ Filter[a]({s ∈ S | s satisfies ϕ}). We show that
s′ satisfies Filter[a](ϕ). From Definition 2.1 there is s ∈ S
such that s ∈ {s ∈ S | s satisfies ϕ} such that 〈s, a, s′〉 ∈ R.
In other words, there is s ∈ S such that s satisfies ϕ and
〈s, a, s′〉 ∈ R.
To prove that s′ satisfies Filter[a](ϕ) we need to show
that ϕ ∧
∧
i≤m(ϕ ⇒ Gi) ⇒ F
′
i )). together with the truth
assignment s′ to P ′ is satisfiable. We show that the truth as-
signment s to P satisfies this formula together with the truth
assignment s′ to P ′. It is not satisfying this formula only if
one of the conjuncts (ϕ ⇒ Gi) ⇒ F ′i or ϕ is falsified. This
cannot be the case for ϕ by our choice of s.
Assume by contradiction that this is the case for some i.
Then, the truth assignments of s, s′ to P,P ′ sanction that
ϕ ⇒ Gi holds but F ′i does not. From the way we defined
R (i.e., RD in equation (1)) we can conclude that F (a, s) is
true in s′ and that s′∩I(a, s) = s∩I(a, s). However, F (a, s)
is the conjunction of heads of activated rules and I(a, s) is the
set of unaffected fluents. If i ≤ l (i.e., ri is an original rule),
then ϕ ∧ (ϕ⇒ Gi) implies that Gi holds in s and the rule ri
is activated. Thus, F (a, s) includes Fi, and Fi is true in s′.
This contradicts our assumption that F ′i does not hold with
the truth assignment s′ to P ′. Thus, there is no such conjunct
in
∧
i≤m(ϕ ⇒ Gi) ⇒ F
′
i )) and the truth assignment s, s′
to P,P ′, respectively, satisfies this formula. From the defi-
nition of Filter[a](ϕ) and Craig’s interpolation theorem for
propositional logic (See Theorem A.1) we get that s′ satisfies
Filter[a](ϕ).
For the opposite direction (showing the right-hand side
is contained in the left-hand side), take s′ ∈ S that sat-
isfies Filter[a](ϕ). We show that s′ ∈ Filter[a]({s ∈
S | s satisfies ϕ}). From Craig’s interpolation theorem for
propositional logic we get that there is a truth assignment s
for P such that the truth assignment s, s′ to P,P ′, respec-
tively, together satisfy ϕ ∧
∧
i≤m(ϕ ⇒ Gi) ⇒ F
′
i )) (other-
wise, there is no such truth assignment, and Filter[a](ϕ) is
not satisfiable; in particular, s′ does not satisfy it). In a man-
ner similar to the first part of this proof (observing the way R
is defined) we can show that R(s, a, s′) and the second part
is done.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. We show this theorem for the set-of-states representa-
tion of belief states, and it will follow for the formula-based
representation.
1. Take a state s′ that satisfies Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ).
Then, there is a state s that satisfies ϕ ∨ ψ such that
RD(s, a, s
′). Thus, s satisfies one of ϕ or ψ because s
is a complete setting of the fluents. Thus, s′ is in one of
Filter[a](ϕ), Filter[a](ψ). From Theorem 3.1 it follows
that Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ Filter[a](ϕ) ∨ Filter[a](ψ).
For the other direction, take s′ that satisfies Filter[a](ϕ)∨
Filter[a](ψ). Then, it satisfies one of Filter[a](ϕ),
Filter[a](ψ). Thus, there is a state s such that RD(s, a, s′)
and s satisfies one of ϕ,ψ. Thus, s satisfies ϕ ∨ ψ and s′
satisfies Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ). From Theorem 3.1 it follows that
Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ)⇐ Filter[a](ϕ) ∨ Filter[a](ψ).
2. Take a state s′ that satisfies Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ).
Then, there is a state s that satisfies ϕ ∧ ψ such that
RD(s, a, s
′). Thus, s satisfies both of ϕ and ψ. Thus,
s′ is in both of Filter[a](ϕ), Filter[a](ψ). We conclude
that every s′ that satisfies Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ) also satisfies
Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ). From Theorem 3.1 it follows
that Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ).
3. Take s′ that satisfies ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧
Filter[a](TRUE). Then, there is no state s such that
RD(s, a, s
′) and s satisfies ϕ. Thus, for every state
s such that RD(s, a, s′) s satisfies ¬ϕ. Since s′ sat-
isfies Filter[a](TRUE) there is a state s such that
RD(s, a, s
′). Thus, this s satisfies ¬ϕ and s′ satis-
fies Filter[a](¬ϕ). From Theorem 3.1 it follows that
Filter[a](¬ϕ)⇐ ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](TRUE).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. Theorem 3.2 supplies the proof of 1, the “⇒” direc-
tion of 2, and the “⇐” direction of 3. Thus, we are left to
prove the “⇐” direction of 2 and the “⇒” direction of 3.
For “⇐” of 2, let s′ be a world state that satisfies
Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ). Then, it satisfies both of
Filter[a](ϕ), Filter[a](ψ). For Filter[a](ϕ) there is a state
s such that RD(s, a, s′) and s satisfies ϕ. Similarly, for
Filter[a](ψ) there is a state s1 such that RD(s1, a, s′) and
s1 satisfies ψ. However, since a acts as a one-to-one map-
ping from S to S, there is only one state in S that maps to s′.
Thus, s = s1, and s satisfies ψ. Thus, s satisfies ϕ∧ψ and s′
satisfies Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ). From Theorem 3.1 it follows that
|= Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ)⇐ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ).
For “⇒” of 3, let s′ be a world state that satisfies
Filter[a](¬ϕ). Then, there is a state s that satisfies ¬ϕ
such that RD(s, a, s′). Thus, s does not satisfies ϕ. Since
a acts as a one-to-one mapping from S to S, there is only
one state that maps to s′ after a. Thus, there is no state s1
that satisfies ϕ and for which RD(s1, a, s′). Thus s′ does not
satisfy Filter[a](ϕ) meaning that it satisfies ¬Filter[a](ϕ).
Clearly, s′ also satisfies Filter[a](TRUE). We get that s′
satisfies ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](TRUE). From Theo-
rem 3.1 it follows that |= Filter[a](¬ϕ)⇒ ¬Filter[a](ϕ)∧
Filter[a](TRUE).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. Let Ψ be the formula on the right-hand side of (5).
Showing that Filter[a](ϕ) |= Ψ : Take Fi1 ∨ ...∨Fiu that
is implied by formula (5). Then, ϕ |= Gi1 ∨ ... ∨Giu , by the
same formula. When we look at the definition of filtering of
a formula (Theorem 3.1) we notice that every Gif , f ≤ u,
appears in this definition or Gif = G¯. The latter belongs to
rm+1, which is the only rule that we use in (5) that is not a
completion rule or an original rule. However, rm+1 follows
from the completion rules in C. Thus, Fi1 ∨ ... ∨ Fiu follows
from the definition of filtering.
We show that B follows from Filter[a](ϕ). For a rule ri
with i ≤ t, we know that L(Gi) ∩ Eff(a) = ∅. Thus, the
completion rules of a ensure that ¬Gi holds after executing
a if it holds before executing a. However, ¬Gi ∨ Gi is a
tautology (thus, in particular, it follows from ϕ), so we get
that ¬Gi ∨ Fi holds in the result of executing a.
Similarly, for a disjunction of rule preconditions,∨
f≤u Gif the disjunction ¬(
∨
f≤u Gif )∨
∨
f≤u Gif is a tau-
tology. From case analysis and Theorem 3.1 we get that in the
consequence of executing a we know G˜i1,...,iu ∨
∨
f≤u Fif .
Showing that Ψ |= Filter[a](ϕ) : We use the equiva-
lence stated in formula (3) by showing that every disjunction∨
f ≤ uFif present in (3) is implied by Ψ.
Take
∨
f≤u Fif to be a conjunct in (3), and assume that
it is minimal (i.e., no other conjunct includes a strict subset
of Fif ’s). Then, ϕ |=
∨
f≤u Gif . If all rif , f ≤ u, are
original rules of a (not completion rules) or completion rules
for literals in L(ϕ), then they all appear in (5), and therefore∨
f≤u Fif appears in (5).
W.l.o.g. assume that we ordered if such that
• rif , f ≤ t, are original rules for a,
• rif , t < f ≤ v, are completion rules literals in L(ϕ),
• rif , v < f ≤ w, are completion rules for literals in
Eff(a) \ L(ϕ), and
• rif , w < f ≤ u, are completion rules for literals in
Eff(a) \ L(ϕ).
Denote the literals that are the heads of the completion rules
lif , t < f ≤ u, respectively. If v = u (there are no literals of
the second and third sort), then we are done, by the previous
paragraphs. Thus, assume that v < u.
We show that
∨
f≤u Fif is implied by Ψ.
ϕ |=
∨
f≤v
Gif ∨
∨
v<f≤w
(lif ∧ G¯) ∨
∨
w<f≤u
lif
by the way we sorted Fif , and the fact that the disjunction∨
f≤u Fif is one of the conjuncts in (3).
Let ψ =
∨
f≤v Gif . Then, ϕ |= ψ ∨ (G¯ ∧
∨
v<f≤w lif ) ∨∨
w<f≤u lif . From this we get ϕ |= ψ ∨
∨
v<f≤u lif .
We make use of Craig’s interpolation Theorem:
Theorem A.1 ([Craig, 1957]). Let α, β be sentences such
that α ⊢ β. Then there is a formula γ involving only nonlog-
ical symbols common to both α and β, such that α ⊢ γ and
γ ⊢ β.
We know that L(
∨
v<f≤u lif ) ∩ L(ϕ) = ∅. Craig’s inter-
polation theorem implies that ϕ |= ψ or ψ ∨
∨
v<f≤u lif is a
tautology. We assumed minimality of
∨
f≤u Fif in (3), so the
first case cannot be.
Thus, it must be that ψ∨
∨
v<f≤u lif is a tautology. Placing
the meaning of ψ in this formula we get that
∨
f≤t Gif ∨∨
t<f≤u lif is a tautology. This means that ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) |=∨
t<f≤u lif .
We know that ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif )∨
∨
f≤t Gif is a tautology be-
cause a ∨ ¬a is a tautology for every sentence a. We look at
two cases:
Case 1: L(
∨
f≤t Gif ) ∩ Eff(a) = ∅ : From this as-
sumption, for every f ≤ t we have ¬Gif ∨ Fif as a con-junct in B. For each j ≤ t we get the implied sentence
¬Gij ∨
∨
f≤t Fif . The conjunction of those sentences for
j ≤ t implies
∧
j≤t(¬Gij ∨
∨
f≤t Fif ) which is equivalent to
¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) ∨
∨
f≤t Fif .
We already concluded above that ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) |=∨
t<f≤u lif , so we get that
∨
t<f≤u lif∨
∨
f≤t Fif is logically
entailed by B and we are done (this last formula is exactly∨
f≤u Fif with some replacement of positions of disjuncts).
Case 2: L(
∨
f≤t Gif ) ∩ Eff(a) 6= ∅ : Our earlier con-
clusion ϕ |=
∨
f≤v Gif ∨
∨
v<f≤w(lif ∧ G¯) ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif
implies that ϕ |=
∨
f≤v Gif ∨ G¯ ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif or ϕ |=∨
f≤v Gif ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif , depending on whether v < w or
v = w, respectively. For the rest of this proof we write θ for
G¯ or FALSE, according to whether G¯ appears in this disjunc-
tion or not, respectively.
Craig’s interpolation theorem implies that either ϕ |=∨
f≤v Gif ∨ θ or
∨
f≤v Gif ∨ θ ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif is a tautol-
ogy. This is because lif is not in L(ϕ). We look at these two
cases separately.
We assumed minimality of
∨
f≤u Fif in (3), so the first
case can be only if w = u (i.e., no literals of the third kind).
Thus, in this case, ϕ |=
∨
f≤v Gif ∨ θ, which is a precondi-
tion for a conjunction in (5). Thus, (5) includes the sentence∨
f≤v Fif ∨ θ in its conjunction.
Now, we know that G¯ |= ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) because
{Gif }f≤t ⊆ {Gi}i≤l. Also, we already concluded that
¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) |=
∨
t<f≤u lif . We get that
∨
f≤v Fif ∨ G¯
logically entails
∨
f≤v Fif ∨
∨
t<f≤u lif which is equivalent
to
∨
f≤u Fif . Thus,
∨
f≤v Fif ∨ θ implies
∨
f≤u Fif , so (5)
implies
∨
f≤u Fif and we are done with this case.
Finally, the second case is that of
∨
f≤v Gif ∨ θ ∨∨
w<f≤u lif is a tautology. (Notice that it is possible that we
can conclude a stronger disjunction when v = w, but we ig-
nore this case because a treatment of the weaker case implies
a treatment for this one.)
W.l.o.g. assume that the literals lif for t < f ≤ v are
ordered such that there is v′ ≤ v with lif ∈ L(Eff(a)) for all
f such that t < f ≤ v′ and lif ∈ L(Eff(a)) for all f such that
v′ < f ≤ v. Then, the formula
∨
f≤v Gif ∨ θ ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif
is equal to
∨
f≤t Gif ∨
∨
t<f≤v′(lif ∧G¯)∨
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨θ∨∨
w<f≤u lif .
Again, we take θ′ to be either G¯ or FALSE, if G¯ ap-
pears in this formula or not, respectively. This implies that∨
f≤t Gif ∨
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨ θ
′ ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif is a tautology.
Consequently, ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) ∧ ¬θ
′ |=
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨∨
w<f≤u lif . W.l.o.g., assume that we ordered {Gif }f≤t
such that there is t′ ≤ t such that L({Gif }f≤t′)∩Eff(a) = ∅
and ∀f (t′ < f ≤ t ⇒ L(Gif ) ∩ Eff(a) 6= ∅. Then,
we rewrite the last formula into ¬(
∨
t′<f≤t Gif ) ∧ ¬θ
′ |=∨
f≤t′ Gif ∨
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif .
Craig’s interpolation theorem implies that there is a for-
mula ξ such that ξ ∈ L(Eff(a))∩L(G¯) and¬(∨t′<f≤t Gif )∧
¬θ′ |= ξ and ξ |=
∨
f≤t′ Gif ∨
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif .
Let im+1 = m + 1 if θ′ = G¯ or im+1 = ∅ other-
wise. From the definition of G˜it′+1,...,it,im+1 we get that
G˜it′+1,...,it,im+1 |= ξ.
Thus, the formula G˜it′+1,...,it,im+1 ∨ θ
′ ∨
∨
t′<f≤t Fif log-
ically entails
∨
f≤t′ Gif ∨
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif ∨ θ
′ ∨∨
f≤t Fif . Also, for every f ≤ t′ we have ¬Gif ∨ Fif in B.
We get that
(
∨
f≤t′ Gif ∨
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif ∨ θ
′ ∨
∨
f≤t Fif )
∧
∧
f≤t′(¬Gif ∨ Fif )
entails
∨
v′<f≤v lif ∨
∨
w<f≤u lif ∨ θ
′ ∨
∨
f≤t Fif ). If
θ′ = FALSE, then this formula subsumes
∨
f≤u Fif . On
the other hand, if θ′ = G¯, then, the same formula logically
entails
∨
t<f≤u lif ∨
∨
f≤t Fif ) because ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ) |=∨
t<f≤u lif and G¯ |= ¬(
∨
f≤t Gif ).
Thus, we are done because B includes G˜it′+1,...,it ∨ θ
′ ∨∨
t′<f≤t Fif , so B |=
∨
f≤u Fif as needed.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 4.5
Proof. We filter each of the literals separately and then com-
bine the results. This is justified by Theorems 3.2,3.4, where
we apply distribution for conjunction and disjunction recur-
sively until we get to single literals.
To filter a literal li in ϕ we need to find the strongest formu-
lae of the form Gi1 ∨ ...∨Giu for i1, ..., iu ∈ {1, ..., l}∪C(li)
that are implied by li. This can be done by enumerating all
disjunctions of this form. There are 2l+2 such combinations
because there are a total of l + 2 rules for every literal (there
is one completion rule relevant for every literal, and we add
rm+1). For every such a disjunction, checking that li implies
it can be done in time 2t by exhaustive enumeration of all
truth assignments on the t symbols comprising the precondi-
tions of a. Finally, computing B can be done in time O(2l+t)
as well.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 4.6
Proof.
Lemma A.2. For a formula ϕ, with L(ϕ) ⊆ Eff(a) and ϕ |=
¬G¯,
Filter[a](ϕ) =
∧
i1, ..., iu ∈ {1, ...l},
ϕ ⇒ Gi1 ∨ ... ∨ Giu
(Fi1 ∨ ... ∨ Fiu)
∧
B
We filter each of the literals separately and then combine
the results using the recursive algorithm presented in Corol-
lary 4.5. However, here we break only disjunctions and leave
the conjunctions untouched.
Every disjunctDi is a conjunction of literals l1∧...∧lu. For
each such conjunction, asserting it and then testing whether
Gi1∨...∨Giu follows can be done in time 2t. We can compute
the DNF formula by distributing formula 5 over conjunctions.
We are left to prove that there are no more than
(
d+c
(d+c)/2
)
·
s resulting disjuncts in this filtering. We do so by showing
that the filtering of every Di is a DNF with at most
(
d+c
(d+c)/2
)
disjuncts. We divide the proof into three cases.
If L(Di)∩ Eff(a) = ∅, then the only disjuncts coming as a
result of filteringDi are those coming from the conjunction of
Di and B. The largest number of combinations of n elements
that do not subsume each other (no combination is a subset
of another) is ( nn/2). Thus, the DNF form of B can have at
most
(
d
min(d/2,l)
)
· cl disjuncts because there are at most l
choices from the Fi’s in creating disjuncts from B and there
are c disjuncts to choose from in each occurrence of a ¬Gi
(and we have a different Gi in each conjunct of B). Thus,
the total number of disjuncts in the filtering of Di is at most(
d
min(d/2,l)
)
· cl.
If L(Di) ⊆ Eff(a), then there are three cases according to
the relationship between Di and G¯. If Di |= G¯, then the fil-
tering is Di ∧ B, as above. Thus, in this case, the proof is
done. If Di |= ¬G¯, then the filtering is in the form of equa-
tion (5) but with no completion rules involved. In this case,
the second part of B is subsumed by one of the disjunctions in
the first part of equation (5). Thus, we are left with a choice
among the d disjunctions in the Fi’s and then a choice of at
most l elements among the disjuncts of the Gi’s. This leaves
us with at most
(
d
d/2
)
· cl disjuncts in the filtering of Di. Fi-
nally, if Di 6|= G¯ and Di 6|= ¬G¯, then we get that the filtering
of Di is the disjunction of the filtering of Di ∧ G¯, Di ∧ ¬G¯.
This is Di ∧ B ∨ (5) for some formula of the form (5) that
does not include completion rules. Using the previous cases
we get that there are at most 2
(
d
d/2
)
· cl disjuncts in this case.
In the third case L(Di)∩Eff(a), L(Di)\Eff(a) 6= ∅. Here,
the same argument as in the last paragraph shows that we have
at most 2
(
d
d/2
)
· cl disjuncts in the filtering of Di.
In the case of an exhaustive set of rules we always know
that Di |= ¬G¯, so the factor 2 above never applies.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4.7
Proof. Take C to be one of the clauses of ϕ. We filter it
separately from the rest and show that the filtering of C with
a is a k-CNF formula. This will imply that the filtering of
the conjunction of clauses is also a k-CNF formula, when we
allow a decomposition over conjunction (as in Theorem 3.4).
We look at the clauses that result from equation (5). First
we look at B. Every parenthesized formula in B is of the form
(¬Gi ∨ Fi) or (G˜i1,...,iu ∨
∨
f≤u Fif ).
The first kind of formula can be written in k-CNF by notic-
ing that if Fi = f1 ∧ ... ∧ fe, then Gi ∨ (f1 ∧ ... ∧ fe) ≡
(Gi ∨ f1)∧ ...∧ (Gi ∨ fe). Since |L(Gi)| −min(1, |L(Fi) \
L(Gi)|) ≤ k, we get that each (Gi ∨ fj) can be written in
k-CNF. Thus (¬Gi ∨ Fi) can be written in k-CNF.
For the second kind of formula, we check the different con-
ditions. First, if l = 1, then we never get a formula of this
kind (only of the first kind). If |⋃i≤l L(Gi) ∪ Eff(a)| ≤ k,
then |L(G˜i1,...,iu ∨
∨
f≤u Fif )| ≤ k, so G˜i1,...,iu ∨
∨
f≤u Fif
can be written in k-CNF. Finally, if |
⋃
i≤l L(Gi) \ Eff(a)| +
l ≤ k, then |L(G˜i1,...,iu)| ≤ k−l, and G˜i1,...,iu can be written
in (k − l)-CNF. Since there are l rules and every Fi is a con-
junction of literals, the disjunction ∨f≤u Fif can be written
in l-CNF. Thus, the combined formula, G˜i1,...,iu ∨
∨
f≤u Fif
can be written in ((k − l) + l) = k-CNF. Thus, B can be
written in k-CNF.
For the main part of the filtered clause in equation (5), we
look at one formula that is part of the main conjunction, i.e.,
(Fi1 ∨ ... ∨ Fiu). C is a clause with k literals, so C = p1 ∨
...∨pv ∨q1∨ ...∨qk−v , for {pj}j≤v, {qj}j≤k−v literals such
that L({pj}j≤v) ∩ Eff(a) = ∅ and L({qj}j≤k−v) ⊆ Eff(a),
for 0 ≤ v ≤ k (i.e., any one of the sets may be empty).
For all j ≤ v, assume that Fij = pj (if pj does not appear
in (Fi1 ∨ ... ∨ Fiu), then the argument is simpler, as will be
apparent shortly (it implies that the resulting formula is even
shorter than our worst-case scenario)).
Now, for every j > v, rule ij refers to an original rule
of a or the rule about G¯ (but not a completion rule). Since
∀j ≤ v L(Fij ) ∩ Eff(a) = ∅, we get that (q1 ∨ ... ∨ qk−v) |=
Giv+1 ∨ ... ∨Giu . Thus, for every j ≤ k − v, qj |= Giv+1 ∨
...∨Giu . From our theorem’s second assumption we get that
|=
∨
j≤u Gij or for every j ≤ k − v there is j′ ≤ u such that
qj |= Gij′ .
If |=
∨
v<j≤u Gij , then
∨
v<j≤u Fij is a consequence of
the filtering that subsumes
∨
j≤u Fij . Now we go back to the
first assumption. If l = 1, then
∨
j≤u Fij is a conjunction
of literals because F1 is a conjunction of literals and there
is only one effect rule. If |
⋃
i≤l L(Gi) ∪ Eff(a)| ≤ k, then
|Eff(a)| ≤ k, so ∨v<j≤u Fij can be written in k-CNF. Fi-
nally, if |
⋃
i≤l L(Gi) \ Eff(a)| + l ≤ k, then l ≤ k, so∨
j≤u Fij is a disjunction of l ≤ k disjuncts (conjunctions of
literals), which can be represented in k-CNF (in fact, l-CNF).
For the last case, we examine what happens when for ev-
ery j ≤ k − v there is j′ ≤ u such that qj |= Gij′ . Thus,
C |=
∨
j≤v pj ∨
∨
j≤k−v Gi′j , which implies that the filtering
of C implies
∨
j≤v pj ∨
∨
j≤k−v Fi′j . This is a formula that
subsumes
∨
j≤u Fij , and it is also a disjunction of k terms,
thus representable in k-CNF.
Thus, we showed that in all the cases either the formula is
subsumed by a k-CNF formula or is itself logically equivalent
to a k-CNF formula. This shows that the filtering of C can be
written as a k-CNF formula. The filtering of ϕ follows using
Theorems 3.2 and 3.4.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 4.9
Proof. Every element of a disjunction Gi1 ∨ ...∨Giu is either
the precondition of an effect rule, a single literal (completion
rule for literals not in Eff(a)) or a conjunction of a single lit-
eral with G¯ (completion rule for literals in Eff(a)). Thus, each
such disjunction is equivalent to a conjunction of (1) G¯, (2)
a disjunction of a set of literals and (3) a disjunction of pre-
conditions of effect rules. The latter has at most l ·d disjuncts
each with at most t literals. Taking one literal from each of
those disjunct leads to a representation of the latter part as a
conjunction of tl·d clauses. G¯ has l · d conjuncts, each of at
most t literals. Enumerating all the clauses that result from
the combination of those parts yields a conjunction of at most
tl·d · (l · d + 1) clauses (we add 1 because if G¯ participates,
then l ∧ G¯ ∨ ... breaks into (l ∨ ...) ∧ (G¯ ∨ ...)).
Now, always if ϕ |= A ∧ B, then ϕ |= A and ϕ |= B.
Thus, if A and B are clauses, then ϕ |= A ∧ B iff there
are prime implicates of ϕ such that one subsumes A and the
other subsumes B. More generally, if Ag , g ≤ z, are clauses,
then ϕ |=
∧
g≤z Ag iff there are z prime implicates of ϕ,
Cj1 , ..., Cjz such that Cig |= Ag , for all g ≤ z.
We get that for z being the number of clauses that represent
Gi1 ∨ ... ∨Giu ,
Filter[a](ϕ) =∧
i1,...,iu≤m, ϕ|=
∨
f≤u Gif
(
∨
f≤u Fif ) ≡∧
i1,...,iu≤m, (
∧
g≤zCjg )|=(
∧
g≤zAg)
(
∨
f≤u Fif ) ≡∧
∃j1,...,jz;i1,...,iu (
∧
g≤zCjg )|=(
∨
f≤uGif )
(
∨
f≤u Fif ) ≡∧
j1,...,jz≤s
∧
i1,...,iu≤m (
∧
g≤zCjg )|=(
∨
f≤uGif )
(
∨
f≤u Fif ) ≡∧
j1,...,jz≤s
Filter[a](
∧
g≤zCjg )
This shows that every conclusion of Filter[a](ϕ) is a con-
clusion from some z clauses Ci for i ≤ s. Thus, the con-
junction of filtering the conjunction of every z clauses from
ϕ results in a formula equivalent to the filtering of ϕ.
Now, we know that Filter[a](ϕ) includes every clause Ci
that satisfies L(Ci)∩Eff(a) = ∅ (follows from (3)). It follows
that we can eliminate from consideration in
∧
j1,...,jz≤s
Cjg
those clauses Ci that satisfy L(Ci) ∩ (Eff(a) ∪ Pre(a)) = ∅,
for Pre(a) =
⋃
i≤l L(Gi), because every clause that they
may imply is subsumed by the clause Gi1 ∨ ...Giu = Ci,
for Gi1 , ..., Giu being the set of preconditions of completion
rules for literals that appear in Ci. Thus, these Ci’s can be
filtered separately from the rest. Call this set of indexes I1
(i.e., ∀i ∈ I1 L(Ci) ∩ (Eff(a) ∪ Pre(a)) = ∅).
On the other hand, every prime implicate clause that we
choose for the conjunction ∧j1,...,jz≤s Cjg determines a set
of literals outside Pre(a) that it can subsume, and that should
be in the disjunction Gi1 ∨ ... ∨ Giu . We get that every con-junction of prime implicate clauses determines (uniquely) a
disjunction Gi1 ∨ ... ∨ Giu that it entails (it may entail a
stronger formula, but the way we match clause sets with these
disjunctions allows us the slack of knowing that if this for-
mula is not the strongest we can entail, then there is another
conjunction that will entail it for us). In particular, let G be
the set of g ≤ z such that L(Cig ) ∩ Pre(a) = ∅. Then,∧
g≤z Cjg |= Gi1 ∨ ... ∨ Giu implies that if g ∈ G, then Cig
subsumes Gi1 ∨ ... ∨Giu . Thus, Filtering Cig implies some-
thing stronger than the one selected for
∧
g≤z Cjg |= Gi1 ∨
...∨Giu . Thus, we can filter allCi’s withL(Ci)∩Pre(a) = ∅
separately from the rest.
We get that we can filter all clauses Ci such that L(Ci) ∩
(Pre(a) ∩ Eff(a)) = ∅ separately, and consider only clauses
Ci with L(Ci) ∩ (Pre(a) ∩ Eff(a)) 6= ∅ in the second stage
(when we choose z clauses and filter them together).
As above, for every disjunction Gi1 ∨ ... ∨ Giu entailed
by ϕ there is such a choice of z prime implicate clauses
that entails this disjunction. The choice of those clauses is
unique, as described above. Thus, when we choose a set of
clauses it is enough to ignore the part of those clauses that is
in Pre(a) and use the rest to find the effects that they gen-
erate in Pre(a). In other words, it is enough to iterate over
choices of disjunctions among G1, ..., Gl, G¯ and the literals
in Pre(a).
Here is the algorithm. For every choice from G1, ..., Gl, G¯
and the set of literals in Pre(a) \ Eff(a) find the CNF repre-
sentation of the disjunction of those Gi’s (there are at most
z clauses, as discussed above). For every clause C in this
CNF select nondeterministically a prime implicate clause Ci
whose restriction to Pre(a) subsumes C. The joint selec-
tion implies the disjunction of those Gi’s and some literals
from Pre(a). Add the proper disjunction∨h≤j(Fih ∨(Cih ∩
Eff(a))) to the result of the filtering. Also, if G¯ is in the set of
original Gi’s that we selected, then let A be the set of literals
of Eff(a) that appear in some Ci. Nondeterministically select
a subset of A and let D be the disjunction of those literals. If
the conjunction of our chosen clauses implies the disjunction
of Gi, when we replace G¯ with D, then add the disjunction
of the original Fi and D to the filtering. (This takes care of
the case that we prove the disjunction of some effect-rule pre-
conditions and the preconditions of some Eff(a)-literals com-
pletion rules.)
This algorithm has 2l·|Pre(a)∪Eff(a)| possible implications
to check. Each implication involves generating the z-sized
CNF, and every clause may match s subsuming clauses from
ϕ. For each combination of such clauses from ϕ we generate
their implied result in the filtered formula. Thus, the time to
compute all the implied clauses from this filtering algorithm
is O(2l·|Pre(a)∪Eff(a)| · (sz + z)).
For the case of |= ¬G¯ we know that there is no need to
include G¯ in the selection algorithm above. Also, we can
omit the second part of the algorithm above. This means that
in this case there are only 2l possible implications to check.
Consequently, the time of the resulting algorithm in this case
is O(2l · (sz + z)).
A.9 Proof of Corollary 4.11
Proof. Notice that Corollary 4.10 and the conditions of our
current theorem imply that equation (6) holds with z = 1,
i.e., that we can filter each clause separately. Theorem 4.7
implies that the result of filtering each clause of ϕ is a k-CNF
formula. Thus, the filtering of ϕ is also a k-CNF formula.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 4.12
Proof. First, we notice that the following hold in a STRIPS
domain for every action a:
Filter[a](TRUE) ≡ F1 ∧ CnEff(a)(G1).
Let Ta = Filter[a](TRUE). We get that for a literal l,
Filter[a](l) ≡
{
Ta l ∈ L(Eff(a))
Ta ∧ l l /∈ L(Eff(a))
Thus, for a set of literals l1, ..., lk we get that equation (7)
holds.
Thus, the main computation involved in filtering a k-CNF
formula is computing Ta. In turn, the only computation
needed there is finding the k-CNF form ofCnEff(a)(G1). This
can be done in time O(2t) and we need to do it only once per
action (in fact, we can do that prior to the computation of fil-
tering, and speed up the real-time filtering of the belief state).
Then, we use a simplified version of the algorithm de-
scribed in Figure 1. We break the k-CNF formula into its
clauses, and filter each of them separately using the equiva-
lence above. This is done in time O(k) per clause, thus yield-
ing a total time of O(s · k).
To see that we maintain a k-CNF all is needed is to notice
that each conjunction that results from filtering a clause in ϕ
is a clause in F1 (which has at most k literals) or a clause
with literals in L(Eff(a)) ∩ L(G1) (which has at most t ≤ k
literals). The only other clause that can be in the result of the
filtering is a clause Ci with L(Ci) ∩ Eff(a) = ∅. This Ci has
k literals because ϕ is a k-CNF formula.
A.11 Proof of Theorem 4.13
Proof. We need to show that ∧i≤s Filter[a](Ci) |=
Filter[a](
∧
i≤s Ci), and the opposite direction will follow
from Theorem 3.2. Equivalence (3) implies that we need
to show only
∧
i≤s Filter[a](Ci) |=
∨
i∈I Fi whenever∧
i≤s Ci |=
∨
i∈I Gi and I is as appropriate in Equivalence
(3).
The proof of Theorem 4.9 shows that clauses Ci with
L(Ci) ∩ (Pre(a) ∪ Eff(a)) = ∅ can be filtered separately.
Call ϕ2 the conjunction of clauses from ϕ that include propo-
sitional symbols from Pre(a) ∪ Eff(a), and call ϕ1 the con-
junction of the rest of the clauses. Also, every disjunction∨
f≤u Gif in Equivalence (3) is implied by some conjunction
of prime implicate clauses from ϕ2.
Now, G1 always holds because a is a (successful) STRIPS
action, so we always know after the action that F1 holds. The
only disjunctions∨f≤u Gif that are not subsumed by G1 are
those that do not include it. The Gi’s that are not G1 and
that might appear in such disjunctions are only preconditions
of completion rules in C(L(ϕ)). In addition, G¯ = ¬G1, and
G1 is consistent with ϕ (we assume that our belief state is
nonempty and that our transition model is correct). Thus,
whenever we can prove from ϕ2 a disjunction ∨f≤u Gif in
which G¯ participates, we can always prove a stronger formula
in which G¯ does not participate (because whatever we prove
has to be consistent with G1, i.e., with ¬G¯).
Thus, we know that we can compute the result of the filter-
ing of ϕ2 by looking at disjunctions ∨f≤u Gif that involve
only completion rules for literals inL(ϕ2)\Eff(a). Thus, each
Gif is a literal that does not appear in Eff(a), and
∨
f≤u Gif
is a single clause C.
If ϕ2 |= C, then there is a clause Ci in ϕ such that Ci
subsumes C because ϕ is in PI-CNF. Thus, for some Ci in
ϕ, Filter[a](Ci) will imply the matching clause sanctioned
by (3). We get that every result of Filter[a](∧i≤s Ci) is
implied by
∧
i≤s Filter[a](Ci), i.e.,
∧
i≤s Filter[a](Ci) |=
Filter[a](
∧
i≤s Ci).
A.12 Proof of Corollary 4.14
Proof. Theorem 4.13 guarantees that we can filter each of the
clauses separately and conjoin the result. From equivalence
(7) we know that the filtering of each clause is equivalent to
Filter[a](TRUE) conjoined with either that clause or TRUE.
First, look at the clauses that are kept from ϕ and those
prime implicates that are given by CnEff(a)(G1). For every
original clause that is kept for the new belief state (after fil-
tering with a), either it is a prime implicate in the new belief
state or it is subsumed by a prime implicate of CnEff(a)(G1).
If it is not subsumed, then it is a prime implicate by defini-
tion. If it is subsumed, then the clause that subsumed it is
a prime implicate by definition. A similar situation holds in
the other direction (clauses of CnEff(a)(G1)). In either case,
those clauses that are left are in k-CNF. Since they are all in
L(Eff(a)), there is nothing else that can subsume them (the
only other thing we add is F1).
Finally, we look at the prime implicates of F1. They are in
the language L(Eff(a)). For every original clause that inter-
sects with this language, that clause is not transferred to the
new belief state. Thus, there is no clause that can subsume
any prime implicate of F1. Since every prime implicate of
F1 has at most k literals, the resulting belief state is a prime
implicate belief state that is in k-CNF.
A.13 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof. Assume that for every filtering problem, T , there is a
belief state representation such that |σi| ≤ poly(|T | ∗ i), as in
the statement of the theorem. Let A,B be two propositional
formulae (in CNF) such that A |= B. ≪Make sure CNF is
OK in Sipser’s paper. –Eyal≫
We now create a dynamic system and a filtering problem T
such that |σi| ≤ poly(|T | ∗ i) and provide an interpolant for
A,B that is of size ≤ poly(|A|+ |B|).
First, we map the propositions of A and B to time 0, 1,
respectively. Let L(B)0 be a set of new symbols that corre-
spond to the symbols in L(B). Let the propositions defining
the state at time 0 be the symbols that appear in L(B)0 ∪
L(A) \L(B). Let L(B)∪L(A) represent the state at time 1.
Now, we map some of the formulae of A,B to the time
steps. Let σ0 = A \ L(B) be the belief state description at
time 0 and let Q1 = (A ∩ L(B)) ⇒ B be a query about the
state at time 1.
We map the remaining formulae from A to effect propo-
sitions. Let E = A \ (σ0 ∪ Q1) be the effect axioms used
in performing an action a1: Every clause of A can be seen
as an effect axiom by viewing those parts of the clause that
are in L(A) \ L(B) to be the preconditions and the parts of
the clause that are in L(A) ∩ L(B) as the effects. We cre-
ate a single action, a, and give all the effect axioms to a. If
F ∨G ∈ E, for F a clause in L(A) and G a clause in L(B),
then add “a causes F if ¬G” to our filtering problem.
For T there is a belief state representation such that |σ1| ≤
poly(|T |). But |T | = O(|A ∪ B|). Thus, |σ1| ≤ poly(|A| +
|B|). Let σ′1 be the syntactic translation of σ1 into the vocab-
ulary L(A) ∪ L(B). We know that σ′1 must logically imply
every interpolant of A |= B because σ′1 implies the set of im-
plicates of A in L(A) ∩ L(B) (σ1 is all that we know about
the belief state at time 1 that logically follows from A’s trans-
lation into our dynamic system setup (this translation is the
state at time 0 and the effect axioms).
Thus, A |= σ′1 and σ′1 |= B and |σ′1| ≤ poly(|A| + |B|).
Since our choice of A,B was arbitrary, this implies that
NP ∩ co-NP ⊆ P/poly by Theorem 3.6.
A.14 Proof of Corollary 3.8
Proof. First, notice that the proof of Theorem 3.7 built a sys-
tem of size equal to the total size of A,B from Theorem 3.6
and the application of a single action was enough to make the
state exponentially large.
Take this system and separate each of the action’s effects
(at most n fluents) into separate actions’ effects. First, for
every effect rule ri of action a, ri corresponds to a clause.
Divide the clause into effect clause effi and precondition
clause prei, each of length l, say. Thus, prei is of the form
prei1 ∧ ... ∧ preli, and effi is of the form effi1 ∨ ... ∨ effli
Add a new set of fluents, f i1, ..., f il , gi1, ..., gil , and new ac-
tions ai1, ..., ail , bi1, ..., bil . For aij we have the precondition
f ij−1 ∧ preji and the effect f ij . We set f i0 to be TRUE in the
initial belief state. For bij , we have the preconditions f il and
the effect f ij ∨ eff
j
i . We set f il to FALSE in the last belief
state.
Do so for all effect rules of action a. Now, join all the
rules aij for all i (holding j) into a new action aj (this has
to be done carefully, to ensure that we always add all that
we know about a single fluent at the same time, so that we
do not override previously asserted effects (as our semantics
dictates)). Applying a1, ..., al results in the same belief state
as after performing a in the original system, and the new flu-
ents are fully known (are set to TRUE or FALSE in the belief
state). Thus, the representation of this belief state is exactly
that of the belief state of the system from Theorem 3.7, so it
is exponential in the sizes of ϕ0 and D.
References
[Boppana and Sipser, 1990] Ravi B. Boppana and Michael
Sipser. The complexity of finite functions. In Jan van
Leeuwen, editor, Handbook of Theoretical Computer Sci-
ence, volume 1: Algorithms and Complexity, pages 757–
804. Elsevier/MIT Press, 1990.
[Cimatti and Roveri, 2000] Alessandro Cimatti and Marco
Roveri. Conformant planning via symbolic model check-
ing. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 13:305–
338, 2000.
[Craig, 1957] William Craig. Linear reasoning. A new form
of the Herbrand-Gentzen theorem. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 22:250–268, 1957.
[Doherty et al., 1998] Patrick Doherty, Witold Lukaszewicz,
and Ewa Madalinska-Bugaj. The PMA and relativizing
change for action update. In Principles of Knowledge Rep-
resentation and Reasoning: Proc. Sixth Int’l Conference
(KR ’98), pages 258–269. Morgan Kaufmann, 1998.
[Ferraris and Giunchiglia, 2000] Paolo Ferraris and Enrico
Giunchiglia. Planning as satisfiability in nondeterministic
domains. In Proc. National Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence (AAAI ’00), pages 748–753. AAAI Press, 2000.
[Fikes et al., 1972] Richard Fikes, Peter Hart, and Nils Nils-
son. Learning and executing generalized robot plans. Ar-
tificial Intelligence, 3:251–288, 1972.
[Kalman, 1960] Emil Kalman, Rudolph. A new approach
to linear filtering and prediction problems. Transactions
of the ASME–Journal of Basic Engineering, 82(Series
D):35–45, 1960.
[Kautz et al., 1996] Henry Kautz, David McAllester, and
Bart Selman. Encoding plans in propositional logic. In
J. Doyle, editor, Proceedings of KR’96, pages 374–384,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 1996. KR, Morgan
Kaufmann.
[Liberatore, 1997] Paolo Liberatore. The complexity of
the language A. Electronic Transactions on Artificial
Intelligence (http://www.etaij.org), 1(1-3):13–38, 1997.
http://www.ep.liu.se/ej/etai/1997/002/.
[Lin and Reiter, 1997] Fangzhen Lin and Ray Reiter. How to
Progress a Database. Artificial Intelligence, 92(1-2):131–
167, 1997.
[McIlraith, 1998] Sheila McIlraith. Explanatory diagnosis:
Conjecturing actions to explain observations. In An-
thony G. Cohn, Lenhart Schubert, and Stuart C. Shapiro,
editors, Principles of Knowledge Representation and Rea-
soning: Proc. Sixth Int’l Conference (KR ’98), pages 167–
177. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, California, 1998.
[Reiter, 2001] Raymod Reiter. Knowledge In Action: Logi-
cal Foundations for Describing and Implementing Dynam-
ical Systems. MIT Press, 2001.
[Sandewall, 1994] Erik Sandewall. Features and Fluents.
Oxford University Press, 1994.
[Simon and del Val, 2001] Laurent Simon and Alvaro del
Val. Efficient consequence-finding. In Proc. Seventeenth
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI ’01), pages 359–365. Morgan Kaufmann, 2001.
[Son and Baral, 2001] Tran Cao Son and Chitta Baral. For-
malizing sensing actions: A transition function based ap-
proach. Artificial Intelligence, 125(1–2):19–91, 2001.
[Williams and Nayak, 1996] Brian C. Williams and P. Pan-
durang Nayak. A model-based approach to reactive self-
configuring systems. In Proc. National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI ’96), pages 971–978. AAAI
Press, 1996.
[Winslett, 1990] Mary-Anne Winslett. Updating Logical
Databases. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
